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ANTENUPTIAL CONVEYANCE OR AGREEMENT
INTENDED TO DEFEAT RIGHT OF ELECTION
JAMES A. VAUGHAN t
S FCTION 18 (9) (a) of the Decedent Estate Law provides that
a waiver or release of the right of election shall be effec-
tive according to its terms whether "executed before or after
the marriage of the spouses affected .... " Section 18(9) (d)
makes it clear such waiver or release may be valid though
executed without consideration.
A right is "waived" when, being known or understood.
it is voluntarily relinquished.1 The word "release," as used
in Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law, seems to have
substantially the same meaning as the word "waiver."
Perhaps the word "release" is more apt than the word
"waiver" because, as applied to estates, it means transfer by
a releasor of his actual or contingent property rights so that
the rights of the releasee are thereby perfected.
Section 18(9), validating a waiver or release executed
before marriage without consideration, was not intended to
abolish rules of equity protective of each party to a future
marriage against fraudulent acts by the other during the
period of engagement.
A distinction should be made between prenuptial prop-
erty transfers and prenuptial waivers or releases. It is the
owning spouse who makes transfers which may later be ques-
tioned while it is the non-owning spouse who grants a signifi-
cant release or executes an important waiver.
As a general rule, a voluntary transfer by an intended
spouse during the engagement period, made without the
knowledge or consent of the other party to the engagement
and altering substantially the property holdings of the trans-
feror, is a fraud on marital right and may be set aside.
t Member of the New York Bar.
2Ansorge v. Belfer, 248 N.Y. 145, 150, 161 N.E. 450, 452 (1928).
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Strathmore 'v. Bowes,2 which was in litigation for many
years,3 is regarded as the leading case on this principle. The
Countess of Strathmore, a widow with three children, entered
into an engagement to marry Mr. Grey. With Grey's con-
sent, on January 10, 1777, she settled her property in trust
for herself and her appointees. By most extraordinary
trickery on the part of Bowes she was induced to break off
her engagement with Grey and to marry Bowes on January
17, 1777. Bowes did not know of the settlement of January
10. Using duress, he caused his wife to revoke her settlement
on May 1, 1777. The act of revocation having been nullified
on the ground of duress, the court considered whether the
original settlement should be set aside as amounting to a
fraud on Bowes. It must be borne in mind of course that
under English law of that time the property of a wife be-
came the property of her husband, in many respects, as soon
as the marriage occurred. The question of transfers made
during an engagement to marry was examined although, on
the facts in the case, the settlement by the bride took place
before she met Bowes. The rule formulated by Lord Chan-
cellor Thurlow was this:
A conveyance by a wife, whatsoever may be the circumstances, and
even the moment before the marriage, is prima facie good; and be-
comes bad only upon the imputation of fraud.... The question which
arises upon all the cases, is, whether the evidence is sufficient to raise
fraud.4
Strathmore v. Bowes and later English decisions were
reviewed in 1867 by Chancellor Bates of Delaware in
Chandler v. Hollingsworth,5 a case later influential in New
York. There, three days before marriage, an intended hus-
band conveyed his real estate in trust for his own benefit for
life, remainder over to his three sisters. The intended wife
did not know that her prospective husband owned the prop-
erty. Consequently, she had no expectations of any kind
2 1 Ves. 22, 30 Eng. Rep. 211 (Ch. 1789).
3 Strathmore v. Bowes, 2 Bro. C.C. 345, 29 Eng. Rep. 194 (Ch. 1789);
id., I Ves. 22, 30 Eng. Rep. 211 (Ch. 1789), aff'd sub norn. Bowes v. Bowes,
6 Bro. Parl. Cas. 427 (H.L. 1797).
, Strathmore v. Bowes, 1 Ves. 22, 28, 30 Eng. Rep. 211, 214 (Ch. 1789).
5 3 Del. Ch. 99 (1867).
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with respect thereto. No misrepresentation of any kind was
made to her by the grantor. On such facts, the question was
said to be this:
Will a court of equity relieve against a voluntary conveyance by the
husband of all his estate made pending an engagement ...without
any disclosure to the intended wife or knowledge on her part, though
without any express misrepresentation or deception practiced by the
husband? 6
Answering affirmatively, Chancellor Bates stated that the
true ground of relief afforded the future spouse against such
a transfer is, not that the transfer disappoints an expecta-
tion, but that such transfer is inherently a fraud upon a
marital right. Such a transfer, though made without knowl-
edge on the part of the spouse adversely affected, is a
"... secret alteration of the circumstances of the parties as
they stood at the time of the engagement."' 7 When parties
are engaged to be married, they are to be considered as stand-
ing in particular relationships to property ownership. A
secret, willful, voluntary and material modification of such
relationships by one party in a manner adverse to the pros-
pective interests of the other should be deemed fraudulent.
The reasoning of Chancellor Bates in the Chandler case
seems to have affected Special Term in Youngs v. Carter.8
In that case Youngs, fifty-two years old and a widower, asked
plaintiff, then twenty-three years old, to become his wife.
Youngs had two children by an earlier marriage. At the time
of the proposed marriage to the plaintiff, he was seized of
real estate in New York City worth $150,000, a fact com-
municated by him to the plaintiff before the offer of marriage.
His proposal of marriage was accepted. Three days before
the marriage, Youngs made a voluntary conveyance of his
real estate to his two daughters, reserving income to himself
for life. It was a secret transfer. Its effect was to deprive
the intended wife of any inchoate right of dower after mar-
riage. She sued to set aside the deed. Special Term held
61d. at 105.
Id. at 111.8 50 How. Pr. 410 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1875), aff'd, 10 Hun 194 (Sup. Ct.
Gen. T. 1877).
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that it made no difference whether such deed was executed
before or after marriage provided it occurred during the en-
gagement. If made after marriage, it could readily be set
aside on the authority of Simar v. Canaday.9 Having been
made before marriage, it was vulnerable because of the prin-
ciples reviewed by Chancellor Bates in Chandler v. Hollings-
worth. The relief granted by Special Term to the plaintiff
was not that the deed should be set aside as to the husband's
daughters. It was declared void only insofar as the dower
rights of plaintiff were concerned. In affirming, the General
Term, First Department, said that the transfer was ". .. a
fraud upon her contemplated marital rights." 10 Such fraud
arises from
* . . all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of
legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, and are
injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious ad-
vantage is taken of another."'
The General Term said that the rule it announced applied
only to real estate because, as to personal property, a wife
could possess no interest comparable to her interest in the
real estate of her husband. On this ground the court in
Youngs v. Carter distinguished Holmes v. Holmes.12
In Bliss v. West,13 a husband before his marriage trans-
ferred a one-third interest in his real estate to his daughter,
reserving the income to himself for life, with remainder over
to his children by a prior marriage. This grant took place
six months before he proposed marriage to the plaintiff. He
stated to his intended wife, however, that he owned the trans-
ferred real estate. A suit to set aside the deed as in fraud
of such wife was unsuccessful. The conveyance in this in-
stance did not come within the principle of Youngs v. Carter
because it occurred before the marriage engagement. A dec-
laration by a grantor subsequent to his grant which derogates
from the title of a grantee is, of course, inadmissible on gen-
eral principles of evidence.
953 N.Y. 298 (1873).10 Youngs v. Carter, 10 Hun 194, 197 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1877).
3. Ibid.
'123 Paige 363 (Ch. 1832).
1358 Hun 71 (Sup. Ct. 1890), af'd, 132 N.Y. 589, 30 N.E. 868 (1892)
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In LeStrange v. LeStrange 14 and Rubin v. Myrub Realty
Co., decided by the Second and First Departments of the
Appellate Division, respectively, it was argued that the prin-
ciple illustrated by Youngs v. Carter ceased to be law in New
York after 1930 because of the abolition of dower and the
creation of new reciprocal rights of husband and wife as
fixed by Sections IS and 83 of the Decedent Estate Law.
The contention was that Youngs v. Carter was essentially
united with the law of dower. This argument was rejected
for the reason, as stated in the Rubin decision, that the pur-
pose of the 1930 change in law was to strengthen marital
property rights.
Perhaps the state of the law today comes to this:
distinctions between personal and real property, for present
purposes, no longer exist. During the period of an engage-
ment to marry, if either party fraudulently transfers a sub-
stantial body of his property, the other party may have the
transfer set aside by action brought either during the mar-
riage or after the death of the transferor, subject, perhaps,
to a defense of laches. 16
Fraud is imputable to the transfer if it is made secretly,
voluntarily and in contemplation of the marriage. Unlike
post-marriage transfers, the transaction need not be illusory
in order that it may be set aside. It is probably sound to say
that the party adversely affected by the transfer need not
have had knowledge of ownership of the property by the other
party to the engagement. A promise by a bride to have her
husband for "richer or poorer" seems to look to the future
only. The embrace of an engagement extends beyond the
person to include such property as he owns at its inception
and, in ordinary course, would own at the marriage.
Property transactions during the period of engagemeni
are to be tested by rules growing naturally from the confi-
dential relationship of the engaged parties. The same is true
with respect to waivers or releases of rights or, more com-
prehensively stated, with respect to antenuptial agreements
14 242 App. Div. 74, 273 N.Y. Supp. 21 (2d Dep't 1934).
15 244 App. Div. 541, 279 N.Y. Supp. 867 (1st Dep't 1935).
36 Simar v. Canaday, 53 N.Y. 298 (1873); Galewitz v. Walter Peek Paper
Corp., 145 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 3 A.D.2d 741, 161 N.Y.S.2d 566
(1st Dep't 1957); In re Ramsey's Estate, 98 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
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of which a waiver or release of property rights, partial or
total, would seem to be the most important ingredient in the
average case.
A waiver or release, to be binding and effective, must be
in writing, subscribed by the maker, and either acknowledged
or proved in the same manner as a recording of a real prop-
erty transfer.17 One party may waive or release his rights
in the other party's estate either before marriage or subse-
quent thereto.'" A waiver or release may be limited, apply-
ing only to a particular will, or general, applying to any
will.'9  Furthermore, a surviving spouse may also waive
whatever rights he has after the death of the other spouse
merely by not exercising his right of election against an im-
provident will.
20
Although a premarital waiver or release requires no con-
sideration for its support, the law gtill is that such waiver
or release must be obtained by non-fraudulent means.
In Pierce v. Pierce,2 ' a future wife, for $500, contracted
to forego any claim to dower or any right to share in the
personal property of her future husband. In setting aside
this agreement the court said:
The surrender and release of rights to be acquired by the intended
wife by the marriage relation must . . . be regarded with the most
rigid scrutiny; and courts will not enforce contracts of this nature
against the wife where the circumstances establish that she has been
over-reached and deceived, or has been induced by false representa-
tions to enter into a contract which does not express or carry out the
real intention of the parties. The relationship of parties who are
about to enter into the married state, is one of mutual confidence,
and far different from that of those who are dealing with each other
at arms length. This is especially the case on the part of the
woman .... 22
7 N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAW § 18(9).
18 Id. § 18(9) (a).
19 ld. § 18(9).
20 See Matter of Laney, 274 App. Div. 250, 80 N.Y.S.2d 421 (4th Dep't
1948).
2171 N.Y. 154 (1877).22 1d. at 157-58.
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In Matter of Liberma, 23 the Appellate Division said:
... [A]t the time the Pierce case was decided (1877), antenuptial
agreements were presumed invalid unless proven otherwise. Now,
however, in view of the expression of public policy by the legislature
in amending Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law, that presump-
tion no longer exists and a prenuptial agreement is presumed to De
valid in the absence of proof of fraud, concealment or imposition.2 4
In Matter of Phillips,25 an antenuptial agreement was
upheld. The court there said of the agreement that it was
.. . fair and reasonable on its face"; 26 there was ". . . no
evidence that facts were concealed or misrepresented ... "; 27
there was no evidence of failure by the wife fully to under-
stand the terms of the agreement; there was no evidence that
the financial provision for the wife ". .. was disproportionate
to the means of her intended husband ... ; 28 and there was
no proof of fraud or overreaching by the husband at any time.
It had been argued to the Court of Appeals, apparently, that
every antenuptial agreement, regardless of its fairness and
reasonableness, is burdened with a presumption of fraud aris-
ing from the confidential character of the relations of the
parties. This argument was rejected. The court said it
would not ascribe to such an agreement:
•.. [I]nherent fraud without regard to the fairness of its provisions
and the reasonableness of the purpose to be accomplished or to the
circumstance in which the agreement was proposed .... 29
The court further said that by reason of the confidential re-
lationship prevailing during the marriage engagement, good
faith of a high standard is required in relation to disclosure
of all circumstances relevant to the contemplated arrange-
ment between the prospective bride and groom. Then the
court added:
234 A.D.2d 512, 167 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1st Dep't 1957).
24 Id. at 517, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
25293 N.Y. 483, 58 N.E.2d 504 (1944).
26 Id. at 490, 58 N.E.2d at 507.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Id. at 491, 58 N.E.2d at 507.
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... [W]here such an agreement becomes the subject of litigation,
the courts will exercise rigid scrutiny as those circumstances are
examined. 30
But still there must be some evidence of "overreaching"
before an agreement, fair on its face, will be overturned.
Such evidence, the court concluded, was present both in the
Pierce case and in the later case of Graham v. Crraham.3 1
In Matter of Yowalkowski 3 2 on the question of burden
of proof where a waiver had been challenged, it was said:
The Appellate Division has correctly defined the proof requisite to
prove prima facie fraud when it is present in transactions taking place
between husband and wife.33
The definition in question was thus stated:
A presumption of fraud will only arise between persons standing in
a mutual relationship of trust and confidence, as in the case of a hus-
band and wife, where there is evidence of some overreaching, misrep-
resentation or deceit by reason of which there was advantage gained
by the one who deceived or detriment to the one who was deceived.
In the absence of such evidence, fraud will not be presumed.
34
Although the Nowakowski case deals with a waiver exe-
cuted by a husband during his marriage, the rule would seem
to be the same for premarital waivers and generally for pre-
marital agreements.
When does evidence of overreaching exist? "Over-
reaching" means ". . . to overdo matters, or get the better
of one in a transaction by cunning, cheating or sharp
practice." 35 To hold that conduct is either cunning, cheating
or sharp practice, a judgment must be reached by consulting
standards of "decent and honorable conduct." What facts
taken together will show failure to comply with the standards
of decent and honorable conduct is a question which, in the
nature of things, must vary from one case to another.
30 Id. at 491, 58 N.E.2d at 508.
31 143 N.Y. 573, 38 N.E.2d 722 (1894).32 2 N.Y.2d 618, 142 N.E.2d 198 (1957).
3 Id. at 622, 142 N.E.2d at 200.
34 Matter of Nowakowski, 284 App. Div. 655, 656, 133 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843
(4th Dep't 1954), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 618, 142 N.E.2d 198 (1957).35 Matter of Baruch, 205 Misc. 1122, 1124, 132 N.Y.S.2d 402, 405 (Surr.
Ct. 1954).
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CONCLUSION
A spouse during the marriage engagement appears to
have no less protection than such spouse gains consequent
upon the marriage status itself. Indeed, on the subject of
voidable transfers of property, it may be that the rights of
a person not yet married but engaged to be married are
superior to the rights possessed as against property transac-
tions occurring after marriage.
As to premarital waivers, releases or agreements em-
bracing waivers or releases, the law as it was understood for
many years before 1930 seems to be the same today. A
waiver, or release or an agreement embodying one or the
other or both, though it may be effectual notwithstanding
the absence of consideration, must stand the test of fair-
dealing by parties occupying a relationship of mutual con-
fidence. That a change has been made in the rules governing
burden of proof, where the claim is made that fraud vitiates
a particular antenuptial agreement is suggested in the late
case of Matter of Liberman. 6
364 A.D.2d 512, 167 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1st Dep't 1957).
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